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Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA 
or the Act), children with disabilities are entitled to a free, 
appropriate public education (FAPE).  The Act provides a procedural 
safeguard for children and their parents seeking to challenge a state 
or local educational agency’s educational plan for the child in the 
form of a due process hearing presided over by a hearing officer or 
an administrative law judge (ALJ).  This article describes the current 
case law concerning the authority of ALJs to sanction parties and 
attorneys for misconduct during these special education proceedings.  
Due to the limited number of cases available on the topic and the lack 
of analysis in literature, this article seeks to offer perspective on the 
types of cases in which sanctions were used and against whom the 
officers issued them, in attempt to provide practitioners and pro se 
petitioners guidance on how to prevent the issuance of a sanction 
against them. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article is a descriptive assessment of the current case law 
concerning the power of hearing officers and administrative law 
judges (ALJ)
1
 to sanction parties and attorneys for misconduct in the 
context of special education proceedings conducted under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or the Act).
2
  
These proceedings are termed “due process hearings” under IDEA.3  
Given the number of cases discussed herein, the variations in state 
administrative law and procedure, and the fact that many special 
                                                          
* Salma Khaleq received her Juris Doctor from DePaul University College 
of Law and is licensed in the State of Illinois. She received her Bachelors Degree in 
Political Science from Marquette University magna cum laude. Salma has worked 
in health care and insurance regulation since 2006.  Currently, she works for Health 
Care Service Corporation, a licensee of the Blue Cross Blue Shield brand in four 
states, in strategy and implementation of provisions of the Patient Protections and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  Thank you to Prof. Mark Weber, St. Vincent de 
Paul Professor of Law, for his guidance and support throughout the writing of this 
Article. 
 
1 In some states, hearing officers are referred to as administrative law 
judges (ALJs).  For the sake of simplicity, this Article will utilize the term ALJ to 
refer to both hearing officers and ALJs. 
2 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2005). 
3 Id. § 1415(f). 
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education opinions are unpublished, it is difficult to ascertain a trend 
in the ways in which ALJs have used their discretionary authority.  
However, understanding the precedents in this area of law can aid in 
determining one’s obligations as a practitioner in the field of special 
education, as a parent party bringing a claim pro se, or as a student of 
special education law.  
The sanctioning authority of judges sitting in federal or state 
court is unquestionable.  However, federal district courts have cast 
doubt on the authority of ALJs to impose sanctions.
4
  Although 
sitting in a quasi-judicial capacity, ALJs have been delegated specific 
statutory authorities, whether under state or federal law, which 
specify the extent to which they may act as “judges” in hearings or 
proceedings.  Few states have explicitly extended sanctioning 
authority to special education ALJs operating under state law.
5
  There 
is an immense amount of variation from state to state in this regard, 
and a comprehensive review of the sanctioning authority of state 
ALJs in general is beyond the scope of this article.  Instead, this 
article focuses on the authority of ALJs in special education.  As of 
the date of this article, the only writing available on the topic is a 
2006 article by Professor Perry A. Zirkel on remedial authorities of 
hearing officers under IDEA, which includes a section on sanctioning 
powers but offers no conclusions.
6
 
This article intends to offer perspective on the factual 
circumstances surrounding the application of a sanction in special 
education cases and attempts to delineate certain categories of 
sanctions employed as well as the parties against whom they have 
been granted.  Part II of this article will discuss the relevant portions 
of the federal law pertaining to education of individuals with 
disabilities and the authority of hearing officers under the Act.  Parts 
III through VI will look at the types of sanctions imposed by ALJs, 
specifically the application of monetary penalties, dismissals of cases 
                                                          
4 GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES, 
AND PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 130 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004) (citing 
case law from the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits).   
5 See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 340.1725e(1)(e) (1994); CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 
11455.30(a) (Deering 2010); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1170(b) (2001). 
6 Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 
421-22 (2006). 
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with or without prejudice, refusal to admit evidence, refusal to allow 
representation, and contempt sanctions.  Part VII will provide an 
evaluation of the case law, focusing on measures practitioners and 
pro se petitioners can take to prevent the issuance of sanctions 
against them.   
 
II.  THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA) 
 
Under IDEA, children with disabilities are entitled to a free, 
appropriate public education (FAPE).
7
  State education agencies 
(SEAs) are charged with ensuring that local education agencies 
(LEAs or school districts) and other state agencies receiving federal 
funding for special education through IDEA comply with the Act’s 
statutory requirements.
8
  Among those requirements is that an 
individualized education plan is put in place for each disabled child 
with the participation of his or her parent(s) or guardian(s).
9
  This 
plan is subject to periodic review and requires parental consent.
10
  
Numerous procedural safeguards exist to ensure that parents can fully 
utilize their rights under the Act.
11
   
One of these rights is that parents may request a due process 
hearing when a dispute arises between parents or guardians of an 
eligible child and the local school district regarding the 
individualized education plan or other facets of the child’s 
entitlement to a FAPE under the Act.
12
  The SEA or LEA must 
conduct an impartial due process hearing in which each party may be 
represented by counsel and has the opportunity to present evidence 
and witnesses on its behalf.
13
  IDEA permits each state to create its 
own hearing procedures and choose the review process.  The limits 
placed on the selection of a hearing officer in the federal statute 
include that he/she not be an employee of the state or local 
educational agency, not have a “personal or professional” conflict of 
interest, possess the requisite knowledge of IDEA and state special 
                                                          
7 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). 
8 Id. § 1412(a)(11). 
9 Id. § 1412(a)(4), § 1436(a)(3). 
10 Id. § 1436(b), (e).  
11 Id. § 1412(a)(6). 
12 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). 
13 Id. § 1415(f). 
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education regulations, and possess the ability and know-how to 
conduct hearings and write decisions in accordance with standard 
legal practice.
14
  Other procedural considerations for these hearings 
are a matter of state law.  For example states can choose either a one-
tier review process or a two-tier review process.
15
  In a one-tier 
process there is a single review by an administrative law judge or 
hearing officer appointed by the SEA, and then any appeal is filed in 
state or federal court.
16
  In a two-tier process, there is an appeals-
level review officer or panel provided by the SEA that reviews the 
lower-tier decisions if they are appealed.
17
  These review decisions 
may be appealed to court.
18
  For the purposes of this article, the 
sanctioning authority of both types of hearing officers is treated in 
concert. 
Like any legal proceeding, the special education hearing 
process may be subject to abuse by either of the parties involved.  
Strategic legal maneuvering or neglect by attorneys may lead to 
waste of time and resources and require disciplinary action.  IDEA is 
silent regarding the sanctioning authority of the individual hearing 
officers.  The United States Department of Education, which 
administers IDEA, has declared that state law dictates whether 
hearing officers can issue sanctions and penalties.
19
  This article’s 
review of the case law examines state-specific precedents allowing 
hearing officers to sanction one party or another in special education 
cases.  The sanctions range from monetary fines and fees to dismissal 
of a case with prejudice or exclusion of evidence. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Id. § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i)-(iv). 
15 NATIONAL DISSEMINATION CENTER FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 
(NICHCY), THE DUE PROCESS HEARING, IN DETAIL, 
http://www.nichcy.org/EducateChildren/disputes/pages/hearings-details.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2012); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (allowing for review of finding 
by a local education agencies to a state education agency). 
16 Id.  § 1415(g)(1). 
17 Id. § 1415(g)(2).  
18 Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). 
19 Letter to Armstrong, 28 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 
303 (OSEP June 11, 1997). 
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III.  MONETARY PENALTIES AS SANCTIONS 
 
Of the fourteen cases discussed in this article, seven concern 
the use of monetary penalties.  IDEA allows courts to award 
attorney’s fees to the prevailing parent in a hearing and SEAs if the 
hearing request is frivolous or brought for an improper purpose,
20
 but 
ALJs in the cases discussed here were not exercising this authority.  
Instead, in each case in which sanctions were imposed, the ALJs took 
it on themselves to award the school districts payments either as a 
general penalty for the parents’ conduct or as reparation for wasted 
attorney time. 
 
A.  Sanctions Imposed Against Parents’ Representatives 
 
In a special education decision in Michigan, the parents of a 
student were ordered to pay the opposing counsel’s costs of $308.86 
based on the parents’ counsel’s “unexcusable failure to communicate 
with the [School] District's counsel in a timely fashion,” and the state 
hearing officer dismissed their case with prejudice.
21
  The parents’ 
counsel attempted to withdraw the due process hearing request two 
days before the deadline for exchange of witness and exhibit lists, 
and failed to return calls from the district’s counsel the following day 
requesting clarification regarding the scope of the withdrawal.
22
  The 
school district’s counsel had prepared witnesses and exhibits for the 
hearing by the deadline and provided them to parent’s counsel.  
Counsel for the parents defended his actions by saying he was “busy 
with other work.”23  In issuing the monetary sanction, the hearing 
officer relied on the state administrative code giving him the 
authority “to control the conduct of the parties or participants in the 
hearing for the purpose of ensuring an orderly procedure”24 as well 
                                                          
20 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 
21 Bd. of Educ. of Hillsdale Cmty. Schs., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 162, 510-11 (Mich. SEA 1999). 
22 Id. at 508. 
23 Id. at 509. 
24 MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 340.1725e(1)(e) (1994). 
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federal guidelines in IDEA which give hearing officers broad 
authority over the hearing process.
25
   
In Indiana, a second-tier review officer upheld a first-tier 
hearing officer’s decision to issue a financial sanction of $500 
payable to the school district for “sham objections” and egregious 
delays by the petitioner’s attorney.26  Counsel for the petitioners had 
failed to comply with discovery requests, causing unnecessary delay 
of discovery proceedings.
27
  The first-level hearing officer believed 
this conduct was an attempt by the lawyer to hide information about 
the recent hospitalization of the attorney’s clients’ child.28  The 
reviewing officer relied on statutory authority,
29
 which allows for 
imposition of sanctions as well as the Indiana Administrative 
Procedures Act (IAPA).  IAPA states that discretionary decisions by 
administrative law judges cannot be reversed without a showing that 
the decision to issue a sanction was “arbitrary and capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”30  
Based on this standard, the reviewing officer found that the first-tier 
hearing officer’s discretionary imposition of the monetary sanction 
was reasonable.
31
  The reviewing officer clarified that the $500 
sanction was to be paid by counsel and not the petitioners because the 
attorney in this case was the child’s stepfather.32   
A hearing officer in Minnesota relied on the Indiana decision 
above and ordered a student’s attorney to pay $2,000 to the school 
district as a disciplinary sanction for pursuing a summary judgment 
motion “without factual basis, upon unsupported and distorted facts 
and upon illogical arguments.”33  The officer reasoned that he 
                                                          
25 Bd. of Educ. of Hillsdale Cmty. Schs., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. at 510 (relying on 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)).  
26 Indianapolis Pub. Sch. 21 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. 423, 426 (Ind. SEA 1994). 
27 Id. at 425. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 426 (citing IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3-8 (1991)). 
30 Indianapolis Pub. Sch. 21 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. at 426 (citing 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-15-5 (repealed 2000)).  
31 IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3-8 (1991). 
32 Indianapolis Pub. Sch. 21 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. at 426. 
33 Dist. City 1 & Dist. City 2 Pub. Sch., 24 INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 1081, 1886 (Minn. SEA 1996). 
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derived his authority to impose sanctions, similar to those imposed 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, from 
the “implied authority” that hearing officers have “to control the 
conduct of the hearing and persons appearing there.”34 
This authority was upheld in another Minnesota case where a 
hearing officer ordered a parent's attorney to pay $5,000 as a sanction 
for filing a frivolous fourth hearing request and to compensate for the 
school district’s costs in defending the action.35  The hearing officer 
found that plaintiffs had previously brought three hearing requests on 
matters that were already under administrative review or had been 
fully litigated.
36
  A second-tier reviewing officer affirmed the 
dismissal and the award of sanctions but reduced the monetary 
penalty to $2,432 because those were the actual costs incurred by the 
defendant.
37
  The case went before a federal magistrate judge, which 
issued a report and recommendation finding that the reviewing 
officer had the authority to assess sanctions against the plaintiff.
38
  
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation upholding the sanction and ruled for the school 
district.
39
  The court cited the state regulation giving hearing officers 
their sanctioning authority, which also allowed them to “do the 
additional things necessary to comply” with special education rules.40  
In an unpublished California appellate decision, Poway 
Unified School District v. Stewart, the court affirmed an order by a 
hearing officer granting a motion to sanction the parent-party for 
improper notice of her withdrawal of a request for a hearing.
41
  The 
California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) ordered the 
parent to pay $3,091.25 in sanctions and costs.
42
  On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals relied on a state statute that authorizes an 
                                                          
34 Dist. City 1 & Dist. City 2 Pub. Sch., 24 INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. at 1886. 
35 Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, No. 98-2246, 32 INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 90, 283 (D. Minn. 2000). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 284. 
40 MINN. R. 3525.4100 (2000) (repealed 2004); Moubry v. Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 696, 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. at 284. 
41 No. D048901, 2007 WL 1620766, *1 (Cal. Ct. App., Jun. 6, 2007). 
42 Id. 
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administrative officer to “order a party . . . to pay reasonable 
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a 
result of bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely 
intended to cause unnecessary delay . . . . ”43  The court dismissed the 
totality of the parent’s arguments and affirmed the award of 
sanctions.
44
   
Another California case, appealed to federal district court, 
involved an ALJ’s monetary sanction of the petitioners’ attorneys for 
filing a motion that was “completely without merit” and in “bad 
faith.”45  The attorneys for the student’s parents had filed a Motion 
for Clarification Regarding the Date of the Hearing after refusing to 
acknowledge that opposing counsel for the school district had not 
waived the resolution session
46
 since the parties had not executed a 
written waiver as required by IDEA.
47
  Finding that the motion was 
without merit for having misinterpreted the governing law and 
neglecting to cite to authority or make good faith arguments, the ALJ 
awarded sanctions in the amount of $300.
48
  On appeal to the federal 
district court, the court upheld the award of sanctions as “supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence” and denied the petitioner’s 
request to reverse.
49
  The court did not expressly discuss the 
sanctioning authority of the ALJ, but its decision to deny plaintiff’s 
                                                          
43 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11455.30(a) (Deering 2010).  
44 Poway, 2007 WL 1620766 at *2.  See also Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Stewart, No. D050202, 2008 WL 607530 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar 06, 2008) (case was 
subsequently appealed and came before the same court again after a bench warrant 
was issued due to the parent’s failure to pay the necessary fees.  The court again 
affirmed its previous ruling and dismissed the parent’s appeal). 
45 K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 995, 
1009 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
46 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2006) (Requiring that a local education 
agency convene a meeting between parents and relvent IEP team members bedore 
conducting a due process hearing).  A resolution session is to be scheduled by the 
school district within fifteen days of the filing of a due process complaint.  At the 
session, the parents, school district and other individuals familiar with the child’s 
IEP meet in an effort to resolve the dispute.  This is conducted unless both parties 
agree in writing to waive the session.  If the school district fails to resolve the 
dispute within 30 days of the filing of the complaint, the due process hearing may 
then take place.  
47 K.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d at 1009. 
48 Id. at 1001, 1009. 
49 Id. at 1010. 
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request to reverse sanctions implies that it found that the ALJ had the 
requisite authority to sanction parties in the proceeding.
50
  
 
B.  Rejecting the Imposition of Monetary Sanctions 
 
Monetary sanctioning authority was rejected in New Mexico 
where an administrative law judge had ordered parents to make their 
child available for a medical evaluation, and the parents continued to 
refuse and delay evaluation.
51
  Although the parents eventually 
complied, the ALJ granted a school district motion for summary 
judgment and recommended that the district’s attorney’s fees be paid 
by the parents as a sanction, even though the hearing officer 
concluded that hearing officers do not have the authority to award 
fees.
52
   
On review, the administrative appeals officer noted that the 
IDEA provides the statutory authority for a “court of competent 
jurisdiction” to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.53  
Neither federal nor New Mexico laws governing due process 
hearings give hearing officers or ALJs the authority to award 
attorney’s fees.54  The appeals officer conceded that some states have 
allowed this practice, but stated that New Mexico has not chosen to 
give its administrative officers this power.
55
  The officer went on to 
state that a hearing officer does not even have the authority to make 
the recommendation that a court award monetary sanctions.
56
  Thus, 
the appeals officer vacated the recommendation as inappropriate.
57
  
However the officer made a cautionary note for parents who disobey 
orders issued in the administrative process, stating that the 2004 
Amendments to IDEA, although inapplicable to the case at bar, 
                                                          
50 The implication is derived from the court’s review of the proceedings 
and the arguments made by the parties, and its ultimate conclusion that sanctions 
were supported by the evidence. 
51 Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 44 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. 205, 1070-71 (N.M. SEA 2005). 
52 Id. at 1071. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1072. 
56 Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 44 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. at 1072. 
57 Id. 
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permit courts to award attorney’s fees if the parent uses the 
administrative or court process for any “improper purpose, such as to 
harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost 
of litigation.”58  
 
IV.  DISMISSALS OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISMISSALS WITH PREJUDICE 
AS SANCTIONS 
 
In four cases surveyed below, the hearing officers dismissed 
special education proceedings in order to sanction attorneys for filing 
the same complaint multiple times and for various types of behavior 
that caused delays, such as refusals to authorize a release of 
information for a child’s records, cooperate in the proceedings, or 
honor requests for information.  Dismissals with prejudice, whereby 
a future hearing request is disallowed, were also considered in two of 
these cases. 
 
A.  Sanctions Imposed Against Parents’ Representatives 
 
In an examination of sanctioning power, a Texas hearing 
officer looked at state and federal law to determine whether dismissal 
of a case with prejudice was within his authority.
59
  In this case, the 
officer found that a parents’ counsel engaged in “sanctionable 
conduct” by filing and dismissing the same special education due 
process request four times so as to “manipulate the hearing settings 
and abuse the hearing process.”60  After the third dismissal request, 
counsel for the parents explained to the hearing officer that the 
dismissals and re-filings were due to counsel’s inability to locate an 
expert witness for the hearing.  The attorney was warned that if there 
were a fourth instance of re-filing and request for dismissal, sanctions 
would be imposed.
61
 The hearing date was pushed back to allow 
counsel to locate an expert, but a day before the scheduled hearing 
the parents’ counsel filed another request for dismissal.62  A hearing 
                                                          
58 Id. at 1073. 
59 Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. 124 (Tex. SEA 2004). 
60 Id. at 554. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
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on sanctions was held and the hearing officer dismissed the case with 
prejudice, finding that this would be an appropriate sanction to 
impose, given counsel’s abuse of the system.63 
In support of this decision, the hearing officer cited a 
provision of the Texas Administrative Code that granted him the 
authority to apply sanctions “as necessary to maintain an orderly 
hearing process.”64  The hearing officer reasoned that since the 
Administrative Code failed to provide guidance on the nature of the 
sanctioning authority, the hearing officer could rely on the Texas 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which the state agency for special 
education has made applicable to these hearings.
65
  The officer stated 
that Texas Rule 215 makes a wide variety of sanctions available to 
judges in Texas, such as orders denying further discovery, orders 
striking pleadings, orders for contempt of court, and orders awarding 
attorney’s fees.66  The officer turned to case law to find that hearing 
officers act in a “quasi-judicial capacity”, and thus, like courts, they 
have inherent powers necessary to protect the integrity of the hearing 
process.
67
  However, the officer rejected a hearing officer’s authority 
to issue most of the Rule 215 sanctions in special education 
proceedings.
68
  Instead, the officer concluded that an appropriate and 
“just” sanction within his authority would be dismissal with 
prejudice.
69
   
In a Michigan case, a hearing officer granted a school 
district’s motion to dismiss the case with prejudice due to the 
parent’s delays and refusal to cooperate in the proceedings.70  The 
case involved parties that previously entered into a settlement 
agreement regarding a child’s IEP (“Individualized Education 
                                                          
63 Id. 
64 Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. at 555; see 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1170(b) (2001). 
65 Id. at 555 (relying on 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185(d) (2001) for the 
proposition stated). 
66 Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP.  at 555; Tex. R. Civ. P. 215. 
67 Ingram Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP.  at 555. 
68 Id. at 556. 
69 Id. at 557. 
70 Okemos Pub. Schs., 29 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 
677, 683 (Mich. SEA 1998). 
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Program”), and the parent requested a due process hearing on issues 
not included in the settlement.
71
  Unrepresented by counsel, the 
parent refused to participate in pre-hearing conferences, ignored 
filings or sought extensions at the last minute, and offered no 
explanations for her failure to make deadlines or retain counsel.
72
  
The officer looked to federal and state court rules to find instances 
where dismissals were warranted, but ultimately, relied on a 
Michigan state regulation,
73
 which allows hearing officers broad 
discretion over the conduct of a special education hearing, as well as 
on IDEA, to issue the dismissal with prejudice in this case.
74
   
In an Ohio state appellate case, the court reviewed a hearing 
officer’s decision to dismiss, with prejudice, a parents’ claim to 
review their child’s IEP because they failed to provide their child’s 
medical and psychological records.
75
  Although the Ohio 
Administrative Code
76
 does not include express provisions 
authorizing a hearing officer to dismiss an action, the appellate court 
found that an administrative hearing officer “is vested with implied 
powers similar to those of a court” since the proceeding is “quasi-
judicial in nature and consists of a hearing resembling a judicial 
trial.”77  However, even though a court would have the authority to 
dismiss a complaint as a sanction, the appellate court noted that a 
dismissal with prejudice is an “extremely harsh sanction” and held 
that lesser sanctions should be used when possible in light of the facts 
of this case.
78
  The court overturned the sanction and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.
79
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71 Id. at 677. 
72 Id. at 683. 
73 MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 340.1725e(1)(c) (1994). 
74 Okemos Pub. Schs., 29 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 
at 683 (referring to IDEA provision 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2005)).  
75 Stancourt v. Worthington City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 841 N.E.2d 812, 
816 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
76 OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-08(F), (H) (2002). 
77 Stancourt, 841 N.E.2d at 830. 
78 Id. at 830-31 (quoting Schreiner v. Karson,  369 N.E.2d 800, 803 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1977)). 
79 Stancourt, 841 N.E.2d at 831. 
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B.  Warning Parents’ Representatives of Future Sanctions 
 
In a case from New Hampshire, a hearing officer ordered the 
parents of a child to execute forms authorizing a release of records 
about their child.
80
  The district had requested the parents to release 
documents regarding their child, who had been evaluated by a 
number of professionals and agencies for the purpose of preparation 
for a due process hearing.
81
  The parents refused, claiming privilege, 
and the district filed a motion to compel pre-hearing discovery.
82
  In 
granting the motion, the hearing officer warned the parents that 
further refusal to sign the requisite documents would result in a 
dismissal of their due process hearing.
83
  The officer relied on 
another New Hampshire special education case, In re Caroline T., 
where the officer had considered dismissing the parents’ case for 
refusing to sign release forms but ultimately declined to do so.
84
  
Instead the hearing officer in that case issued an order compelling the 
parents to comply with a district’s discovery order, warning that 
further failure to comply would result in imposition of a sanction.
85
  
 
V.  REFUSAL TO ADMIT FACTS OR DOCUMENTS INTO EVIDENCE 
 
Among the most commonly used sanctions in typical court 
cases is the exclusion of evidence.  In the special education context, 
two cases involved excluding evidence for failure to offer it in a 
timely manner as required by the procedural rules governing the 
adjudication under state law.  One appellate panel review of the 
hearing officer’s decision concluded that each hearing officer has 
broad discretion in the conduct of the proceedings, including whether 
or not to allow in certain evidence.
86
 
                                                          
80 Epsom Sch. Dist., 31 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 
120, 445 (N.H. SEA 1999). 
81 Id. at 444. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 445. 
84 Id. at 444; In re Caroline T., 16 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. 
L. REP. 1340 (N.H. SEA 1990). 
85 Id. at 1341. 
86 Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 26 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. 1370, 1372 (Penn. SEA 1997). 
    
Spring 2012 Sanctioning Authority 15 
In a due process hearing in Tennessee, an administrative law 
judge issued a pre-trial order compelling a school district to disclose 
certain documents within five business days before the hearing.
87
  
The district failed to provide the documents in a timely fashion and 
refused proffer of the parents’ documents.88  In ruling on the parent’s 
request for contempt against the school district, the ALJ stated that 
pursuant to state statute, he had “no powers to fine or jail anyone” as 
a sanction for conduct.
89
   Instead, the ALJ reasoned that the only 
remedy that would be available to him in this case would be to refuse 
to allow the school district to enter any documents into evidence if 
they were submitted at a later date.
90
 
 
VI.  ALLOWING PROCEEDING TO CONTINUE WITHOUT 
REPRESENTATION 
 
One special education case involved the imposition of a rare 
sanction by a hearing officer, forcing the petitioner to proceed 
without representation.
91
  An appellate review of this decision 
declared that this was a harsh and unreasonable sanction.
92
 
A Maine federal district court review of a special education 
case resulted in admonishment of a hearing officer for having 
allowed a due process proceeding to continue without the pro se 
parent party present.
93
  The court noted that the parent representative 
requested multiple continuances during the proceedings on numerous 
grounds including that the parent had developed a “serious illness.”94  
The hearing officer seemed to have assumed that the parent was 
feigning illness to obtain a continuance for her case, given that the 
hearing officer contacted her at various times to obtain 
                                                          
87 Smith Cnty. Sch. Sys., 27 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. 764, 764 (Tenn. SEA 1998). 
88 Id. at 775. 
89 Id. at 766; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4-5-301 (1998). 
90 Smith Cnty. Sch. Sys., 27 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. 
REP. at 766. 
91 Millay ex rel YRM v. Surry Sch. Dep’t, 707 F. Supp. 2d 56, 65 n.3 (D. 
Me. 2010). 
92 Id. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. 
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documentation from her medical doctor.
95
  Due to her lack of 
communication and the belief on the part of the hearing officer that 
she had failed to provide proof of a medical evaluation for her illness, 
the officer allowed the proceeding to continue without the parent’s 
presence.
96
  Although the parent was later able to provide 
documentation stating that she had developed acute bronchitis during 
the time period in question, the hearing officer had already allowed 
the school district to present its case-in-chief in its entirety without 
cross-examination.
97
  The district court stated that this was in effect a 
“sanction” which had “turned out to be extreme.”98  The court stated 
that the hearing officer should have continued the hearing for a few 
days to determine whether the parent was indeed sick and if not, then 
“impos[ed] a carefully devised sanction” making sure to sanction the 
pro se parent and not penalize the student.
99
 
 
VII.  CONTEMPT SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DUE 
PROCESS DECISIONS 
 
In contrast to the cases discussed above which sanctioned 
misconduct occurring during the proceedings, in the case discussed 
below, the parents requested the issuance of a sanction to force 
implementation of a final decision previously rendered against a 
school district.
100
  At the conclusion of a special education 
proceeding, the decision made by the ALJ is considered final, 
although the parties can still appeal the decision to a state or federal 
court.
101
  Generally, a party that is aggrieved by the ALJ’s decision 
must exhaust state administrative procedures before bringing a civil 
action in state or federal court.
102
  Although there is no specific 
provision addressing enforcement of hearing officer decisions in 
                                                          
95 Id. 
96 Millay, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 65 n.3. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 64 n.3. 
100 Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUC. L. REP. 128, 411 (Cal. 2000). 
101 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1) (2005). 
102 An aggrieved party in this context is the losing party at the due process 
hearing. See Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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IDEA, case law has indicated that parties seeking to compel 
enforcement of the final decision made by the ALJ may appeal 
directly to state or federal courts and are not obligated to exhaust 
remedies.
103
  Another way to enforce ALJ decisions is through the 
state educational agency.
104
  In New Jersey, for example, since ALJs 
do not retain jurisdiction after a final decision is rendered, 
enforcement of the decision must be accomplished by the state 
educational agency.
105
  The case below was brought by the parents 
before a hearing officer to compel enforcement through use of 
contempt proceedings.
106
   
In California, a hearing officer denied a request to initiate 
contempt proceedings against a school district
107
 for failure to 
comply with orders in a previous special education decision to 
reimburse parents for unilateral placement and services.
108
  The 
hearing officer found that he had the requisite authority, under 
California regulations, to “initiate contempt sanctions against a 
person in the superior court in and for the county where the hearing is 
being conducted.”109  This may be done in response to disobedience 
of a lawful order or failure to comply with an order.
110
  However, 
there must be a showing of “bad faith actions or tactics that are 
frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay” pursuant to 
California’s Code of Civil Procedure.111  The hearing officer could 
                                                          
103 Id. at 1272-73. 
104See Theodore A. Sussan, Enforcing Administrative Law Special 
Education Decisions During the Appeal Process, 222 N.J. LAW. 52, 53 (June 
2003). 
105 Id. 
106 Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUC. L. REP. at 410. 
107 As demonstrated by cases outlined in this Article, requests for 
sanctions against school districts are rare. 
108 Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUC. L. REP. at 410. 
109 Id. at 129; see CAL. CODE REGS. 5 § 3088 (a), (c); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
11455.20(a) (West 1997). 
110 Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUC. L. REP. at 410. 
111 Id. at 411 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 2000)). 
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not find that such obstructive actions were taken by the district and 
denied the motion for sanctions.
112
   
 
VIII.  EVALUATION: AVOIDING SANCTIONS AS A PRACTITIONER IN A 
SPECIAL EDUCATION PROCEEDING 
 
If the precedents outlined above demonstrate anything, it is 
that parent attorneys and pro se parents bringing due process hearing 
requests ought to be especially careful of the potential for sanctions 
ranging from dismissals with prejudice to monetary sanctions or 
exclusion of evidence.  Of the fourteen cases discussed above, twelve 
involved sanctions against the parent-party and/or their 
representatives.  Although this cannot be viewed as a trend by any 
means, given the fact that many ALJ decisions are unpublished, it is 
telling of the type of sanctioning authority granted to ALJs across 
various states under each state’s interpretation of IDEA.   
Given the relatively loose structure of the due process hearing 
in special education under IDEA, ALJs have attempted to utilize state 
regulations and cases defining sanctioning authority from other states 
to find ways to curb abuse of the process by attorneys or pro se 
parents.  Generally, procedural requirements, such as timing for 
filings of documents in evidence, appearances before the ALJ, or the 
filing of the due process request multiple times, are of particular 
concern to ALJs, as evidenced by the cases discussed in the 
preceding sections.  The cases described in this Article provide 
overwhelming support for the authority of ALJs to sanction parties in 
a proceeding.  Appellate review of these decisions whether by a 
second-tier reviewer or a state or federal judge has resulted in 
upholding the discretionary authority of the lower-level ALJ in 
nearly all instances.  
Legal practitioners ought not mistake the informality of the 
system set up under IDEA as laxity.  They ought to treat the process 
with the same respect and care as they would a proceeding before a 
court of law.  Given the potential for prejudice to their claims, pro se 
parents and representatives ought to be especially cautious when 
                                                          
112 Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUC. L. REP. at 411. 
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bringing a due process claim.
113
  A due process hearing request 
requires due diligence, effective communication throughout the 
process, compliance with judicial orders, and cooperation with 
opposing counsel to prevent the issuance of a sanction against them 
for procedural misconduct.  School district attorneys are most 
experienced with these types of proceedings and this may be why 
examples of sanctions against them were less common in the survey 
of cases made in this Article.  However, the two examples provided 
where the ALJ contemplates disciplinary sanctions against counsel 
for the school district demonstrate that they too, are not immune.
114
 
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
 
This description of the sanctioning authority of special 
education ALJs demonstrates relative uniformity among a number of 
states in which ALJs have authority to issue disciplinary sanctions.  
However, there is no agreement as to the type of sanctions within the 
scope of their authority.  Indeed, this Article illustrates the 
divergence of opinion on the appropriate sanction to be employed by 
the ALJ.  Overall, it serves as a reminder to practitioners representing 
parents in special education cases and pro se parents to treat the 
process with the utmost diligence, timeliness, and respect so as to 
avoid potentially damaging consequences for the child seeking to 
assert rights under IDEA. 
                                                          
113 For example, monetary sanctions may impact a parent’s ability to 
afford to continue bringing their claim before a hearing officer.  
114 See supra sections V, Refusal to Admit Facts or Documents into 
Evidence, and VII, Contempt Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Due Process 
Decisions. 
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